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By ALFRED L. WOLF
General Counsel, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
A BODY of case law has developed on the question of the airport's
place in the community. Recent decisions offer ample material
to one searching for authority in asserting the importance of airports
and their attendant activity.
As the flood of illy considered, or lightly instituted, litigation
against the construction or maintenance of airports seems to be steadily
increasing, there are set forth here reactions representative of what
might well be termed "airminded thinking" of several courts arising
from a variety of suits brought against airport interests. The Courts of
Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have
all recently decided litigation connected with the establishment of air-
ports and it is interesting to notice the encouragement their decisions
lend to the aviation industry. Selecting the most recent case,, a deci-
sion by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, captioned Crew v. Gal-
lagher,' one finds the following passages:
"There is nothing in the construction of an airfield, or in the
necessary consequences of its normal operation in an agricultural
district to create a nuisance . . .
"The testimony discloses no additional volume of objectionable
noise in comparison with the existing noise level in the immediate
vicinity of the proposed airport. Farm tractors, passenger cars
and heavy trucks on the adjacent highway, trains on the main line
of the railroad nearby, and military and transport aircraft having
no connection with the airport in question, already disturb the
tranquility of this, neighborhood. 'No one is entitled to absolute
quiet in the enjoyment of his property; he may only insist upon a
degree of quietness consistent with the standard of comfort pre-
vailing in the locality in which he dwells.' Collins v. Wayne Iron
Works, 227 Pa. 326, 331, 76 A. 24."
The Pennsylvania court recognized that if the citizens of today are
to accept the benefits of modern conveniences and scientific advance-
ment, they also must be willing to accept as aspects of modern living
the minor irritations which occasionally accompany such development.
The opinion of the lower court granting an injunction restraining the
use of certain property as an airport therefore was reversed.
In Antonik v. Chamberlain,2 the Ohio Court of Appeals stated:
1 Pa. Sup. Ct., Eastern Dist. (Mar. 25, 1948). 2 Avi 14, 587.
2 Ohio Ct. of App., 9th Jud. Dist. (Dec. 23, 1947), 2 Avi 14, 500.
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"In our business of judging in this case, while sitting as a court
of equity, we must not only weigh the conflict of interests between
the airport owner and. the nearby landowners, but we must further
recognize the public policy of the generation in which we live.
We must recognize that the establishment of an airport of the kind
contemplated is of great concern to the public, and if such an airport
is abated, or its establishment prevented, the consequences will be
not only a serious injury to the owner of the port property but may
be a serious loss of a valuable asset to the entire community.
"To find that the use as an airport of approximately 450 acres
of land beyond the city limits and away from the closely-built-up
and congested part of the city is an unreasonable use of the land,
would, we think, under the circumstances of this case, obstruct the
development of aviation, as a legitimate and necessary industry,
to an unreasonable extent.
"Undoubtedly the plaintiffs will experience some discomfort,
but that is one of the incidents or results of residing in a heavily-
populated, highly industrialized state. It is an incident of living in
an age of progress, in which there are erected huge rubber facto-
ries, with their accompanying smells and noises; in which the
streets and highways are used by great, noisy trucks for transpor-
tation; in which commercial airliners ply the skies continuously,
for the speedy transport of persons and freight; and in which
thousands of various industries throughout the cities and country-
side contaminate and defile the former natural beauty, peacefulness
and quiet of the vicinage."
In this case, the plaintiffs sought to restrain, in anticipation thereof,
the operation of an airport "because of (1) noise, (2) dust, (3) attrac-
tion of crowds, who will trespass on their premises, (4) annoyance in
the peaceful enjoyment of their homes, (5) fright and fear of physical
harm from low flying and the crashing of planes, (6) depreciation of
property values." These allegations follow the formula of most earlier
cases.8 The trial court which had enjoined the airport project was
reversed by the quoted decision.
Florida has spoken most dramatically. As recently as November 7,
1947, its Supreme Court, in Frink v. Orleans Corp.,4 in overriding the
attempt of the city of Miami Beach so to zone a portion of its land
as to prevent the construction of an. airport quoted the following
passage from its earlier decision in Stengle v. Crandon:5
"In almost every town of any consequence in Florida for more
than three years the sound of airplanes has been almost incessant
as men trained in them for the very purpose of safeguarding the
constitutional guaranties, including the one that a person may not
be deprived of property without due process of law, by warding off
the attacks of enemies advocating the ideologies which were the
very antitheses of the American system of government. These
3 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F. 2d 929, 1930 US AvR 21 (D.C.
Ohio, 1930), modified 55 F. 2d 201, 1932 US AvR 1 (C.C.A. 6th, 1931); Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 1930 US AvR 1 (1930);
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F. 2d 755, 1936 US AvR 1 (C.C.A.
9th, 1936) cert. denied 300 U.S. 654, 1937 US AvR 173 (1937).
4 Fla. Sup. Ct., Div. B (Nov. 7, 1947), 2 Avi 14, 468, 32 So. 2 425.
5 Fla.-, 23 S. 2d 835 (1945).
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airplanes are not mere noisy nuisances, nor are they vehicles still
in the experimental stage, but they represent the latest means of
transportation, and certainly if we are to progress, the establish-
ment of airports to accommodate them should be encouraged."
The Stengle case,6 decided Nov. 27, 1945, was also an appeal from
the action of a Zoning Board. Here the state supreme court, however,
took the affirmative action of reversing an order dismissing a Bill of
Complaint wherein the airport owner prayed that the Board be or-
dered so to zone his tract that he could construct an airport upon it.
In New Jersey aviation's maturity has been recognized and the New
Jersey Chancery Court recognizes that like the steam railroad, aviation
has passed its early days. The following language is taken from
Oechsle v. Ruhl:7
"Although not so alleged in specific words, the gravamen of
the bill is that the construction of an airport constitutes a nuisance
per se. The great advances made in aviation during the past
three decades have clearly demonstrated the necessity of this type
of commerce. Not only have there been tremendous and, in retro-
spect, almost unbelievable strides made in the construction of aero-
planes during this period of time, but the modernization of airport
construction has had to keep pace with the advance of aeroplane
construction. The thousands of airports and airfields in their
varied and diverse locations are proof that they are not nuisances
per se. The argument advanced by complainants is comparable to
that advanced while steam railroads were in their infancy. The
legislative grant of authority to the State Aviation Commission to
issue licenses as above stated is a recognition of the construction,
operation and conduct of an airport as a legal business."
In this case, a bill of complaint was filed asking an injunction, inter
alia, against construction of an airfield which was stricken as to that
prayer by the New Jersey Chancery.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, hostilities elsewhere had prompted the Fed-
eral Government to make aviation instruction available in Universities.
The University of Virginia needed an airport for this activity. Neigh-
boring landowners attempted to enjoin its establishment and on Sept.
5, 1940, the Virginia Supreme Court took a view parallel to that of the
other states mentioned. In Batcheller v. Commonwealth,8 much lan-
guage encouraging to aviation's advocates can be found:
"Aviation is a lawful business and the owner of real estate
has a right to establish an airport thereon if it is properly located
and properly operated, notwithstanding for aesthetic and senti-
mental reasons it may not be agreeable to persons owning fine
country homes in the community." and
"They have been fortunate in that they have been able to enjoy
their country estate as they have for so long a time. They must
now yield to change and progress of the time." and
"It is inconceivable that Thomas Jefferson, who left this for his
6 Idem.
7 N. J. Chancery, 54 A. 2d 462, 2 Avi 14, 418 (1947).8 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. 2d 599 (1940).
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epitaph, now carved upon a shrine at Monticello: 'Here was buried
Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, of
the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of
the University of Virginia', would have objected to or tolerated
any objection to the establishment of the airport in question,
shown to be essential to proper and full instruction in aeronautics,
which is today so essential to the safety of the nation and the de-
velopment of its commerce, and most probably had he been living
at the time of the hearing upon the application for the permit in
question, he would have been one of the strongest advocates for
granting it. No reason is perceived why because the airport in
question is located in an historic section in which many great men
have lived and where they have died and were buried, scientific,
educational, economic, and commercial development should not be
sanctioned or countenanced, but instead such section should be left
to the enjoyment of those having fine country homes, who object
to any activity tending to interfere with their peace of mind,
whatever that may be, or the quietude of the countryside, whatever
that may be. If such a policy should be adopted, development of
Virginia, so famed in history and having so many 'historic shrines,'
would be seriously retarded."
In Michigan, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court by divers
plaintiffs who had failed in the Court below to prevent the City of De-
troit from obtaining more land for its airport and to obtain relief from
harm to neighboring properties by the airport's operation and manage-
ment. In 1944 the Supreme Court in its decision,Warren and Agar v.
Detroit, said:
"The city stated that the city might not use the proposed
airport for the larger or heavier planes which necessarily fly much
lower when landing or taking off, and could possibly cause a nui-
sance to plantiffs. If the airport cannot be used for very large air-
planes, the city might find itself at the end of a side line, from
which smaller craft would have to be flown to other cities which had
the foresight to provide airports of a proper size in a locality free
from obstacles so as to accommodate transcontinental and the other
larger airplanes. We take judicial notice of the tremendous in-
crease in the size of airplanes during the past few years."
The lower court was upheld and the appeal denied.
From these decisions of representative state courts one sees that to-
day the careful advocate no longer need speak with a prophet's voice of
the future treatment aviation will receive in the courts. These deci-
sions demonstrate that the courts have and will continue to recognize
the airport's place in the modern community.
9 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W. 2d 134 (1944).
